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California Institute of Technology


# SmallSat Reliability

*D.J. Sheldon, Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO)*

*Office of Safety and Mission Success*

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology


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

# Overview

- SmallSat Overview
- Quality and Reliability for Spacecraft Classes
- JPL Assurance Tailoring Process
- Highlights of Recent Mission Activities at JPL
  - EEE parts comparison
  - Inspection analysis
- Deep Space Cube/SmallSats
- Conclusions


# SmallSat History and Projections



- Between 250 to 400 SmallSat launches **each** year for the next 4 to 5 years are planned
- Almost 2,400 SmallSats are planned or announced from 2017 to 2023
- 70% of future SmallSat launches are expected to be by commercial companies, not universities or governments.
- Earth observation and remote sensing are becoming the dominate use for SmallSats




# SmallSats – Where are they going?




<https://www.planet.com/pulse/keeping-space-clean-responsible-satellite-fleet-operations/>

- For altitudes > 550km, orbital lifetime > 10 years
- Over 80% of microsatellites launched in the next 3 years are expected to launch to synchronous or polar orbit, as compared to only 39% in the previous 3 year period<sup>1</sup>.




CubeSats STMSat-1, CADRE and MinXSS are deployed from the International Space Station during Expedition 47. **Credits: NASA**

# Quality vs. Reliability



- Quality issues (defects) are the root cause for infant mortality region
  - Manufacturing variation
  - Incoming material
  - Poor design margin to variation
  - Early sensitivity to application of voltage/temperature/current
- Reliability issues (wear-out) drive end of life region
  - Physics of failure related
    - Dielectric breakdown
    - Electromigration
    - Etc..

# Reliability of “heritage” satellites > 100kg




- Total sample size = 1584
- >99% operational at time of launch
  - (<1% DOA / Early Fails)
- Continued decreasing reliability as time increases

$$R(t) = e^{-(t/\theta)^\beta}$$

$$\beta = 0.3875 \quad \theta = 8316 \text{ years}$$

# What about CubeSat reliability...?




**Figure 1: CubeSat reliability with 95% confidence interval – first year in orbit**

*Reliability of CubeSats – Statistical Data, Developers' Beliefs and the Way Forward, Martin Langer, SSC16-X-2 2016*

- 178 CubeSats launched through mid-2014.
- Very steep initial drop in reliability => large number of deployment/DOA failures
- $\beta_1 = 0.9$  (decreasing failure rate)
- $\beta_2 = 1.0$  (constant failure rate)

$$R(t) = \text{PNZ} \alpha_1 \exp \left[ - \left( \frac{t}{\theta_1} \right)^{\beta_1} \right] + \alpha_2 \exp \left[ - \left( \frac{t}{\theta_2} \right)^{\beta_2} \right]$$



# Heritage and CubeSat Reliability Plotted on Same Curve



- Both CubeSat and Heritage show *decreasing* reliability with *increasing* time
- Both CubeSat and Heritage Weibull shape parameter  $< 1$ , indicating early failures (“infant mortality”)
- Weibull shape parameter  $= 1$  implies bottom of bathtub/random failure regime
- Implies both types of missions in a failure regime dominated by **defects** in design, materials, and variation
- Increasing failure rate with time (ageing/wear out) is not seen
- ***Importance of mission assurance to address defects and quality related issues***





# Series and Parallel System Reliability



- Series Reliability ( $\prod_{i=1}^n R_i$ ) .vs. Parallel Reliability ( $1 - \prod_{i=1}^n [1 - R_i]$ )
- Parallel system reliability with low reliability items quickly becomes much more reliable than single high reliability item
- All commercial small missions are becoming constellations to take advantage of this concept (along with improvements in performance capabilities).
- Reliability through redundancy and replacement

# Relationships of Spacecraft Reliability and Mission Assurance



How to define a minimum reliability while balancing mission assurance activities & cost?

- JPL developed three project types to address balance between reduced cost and different/increased risk and overall mission reliability

# JPL Flight Project Practices and Project Types



- JPL Flight Project Practices (FPP):
  - Establish standards of uniformity, where standardization is judged to have significant benefit.
  - Capture the approaches and methods important to sponsors.
  - Incorporate lessons learned that were key to past successes, and where deviations created significant problems
  - Identify mandatory practices (“**shalls**”) that require management review and approval to waive.
  - Identify guidance (“shoulds”).
- JPL has defined three types of projects:
  - **Type I** primarily contains space flight projects with NPR 8705.4 risk classifications A, B, & C (or equivalent for other sponsors).
  - **Type II** primarily contains risk class D space flight projects (or equivalent for other sponsors), or other space flight projects that do not get risk classified (e.g., NPR 7120.8 projects).
  - **Type III** primarily contains projects that do not go into space (i.e., sounding rockets, balloons, aircraft payloads, and ground based projects), however, some such projects may still be assigned to Type II.

# Tailoring FPP to Type II Missions

- Type II missions are tailored with support of an advisory board
  - Class D / Technology Advisory Board (DTAB)
  - Reduce project cost by changing/reducing scope.
  - Reducing the scope implies different risk posture.
  - Balance reduction in cost from decreasing scope against the change in risk posture.
- Almost all of the Type I FPP (332 total line items) “**shalls**” become “should” for Type II
- Type II “**shalls**” are focused on Quality Assurance
  - Formal plan (QARTA) with customizable choices for given mission risk posture
    - *Receiving/shipping and in-process inspections*
    - *Handling and testing of flight equipment*
    - *Software traceability matrix verification*
    - *“as-tested” and “as-flown” configuration records*
    - *Environmental testing monitoring*
    - *Critical flight movement and facilities inspection/verification*

# Case Study – Type I vs Type II - HQA In-Process/Testing Inspections



## Part Quantity Rejected/Accepted



- Percentage rejection rate higher for Type I => additional requirements
- However Type II rejection rate is still significant
- HW used by Type II projects is **not** significantly lower quality (higher defectively)



# HQA In-Process/Testing Inspections

## Dispositions of Rejected Line Items





- Type II projects tend to scrap and/or rework more than Type I

# High-Impact HQA In-Process/Testing Defects with LU/RTV/RPR/RWK/SCRAP Dispositions



- Defects are dominated by workmanship and damage
- Formal defect reduction plans and overall process capability improvement (both internal and external) required

# Examples of Type II Defects


Type of Defect	Use-As-Is Disposition Pulled from QARS	Rework Disposition Pulled from QARS
Damage	<p>Damage found on microcircuit. Damage is contained within the package and does not appear to start a crack in the package but more like a chip-out</p>  A photograph of a square microcircuit package mounted on a green printed circuit board (PCB). The package is dark grey with some markings. There is a small, irregular chip-out or damage on the top edge of the package, highlighted by a red arrow.	<p>C52 has a gouge out of the end cap. Remove and replace C52 with a new part.</p>  A close-up photograph of a cylindrical capacitor, labeled C52, mounted on a green PCB. The capacitor has a brown body with silver end caps. A red circle highlights a significant gouge or chip-out on the top silver end cap.



# NASA NEPP CubeSat Parts Data Base

- > 2200 individual lines of data
  - Line = Part and corresponding part number
- Consistent trends
  - 33% of total parts are common to at least two or more board designs
  - ~98% of parts are rated for industrial (-40C to 85C) or more temperature
- Almost all passives are SMD 0402 or larger
  - Only 25 parts are listed as SMD 0201, nothing smaller
- Approximately 33% of passives are qualified for automotive use (AEC-Q200)
  - 30% of passives are manufactured by non-QML vendors
  - Polymer tantalum capacitors are 33% of all tantalum capacitors
    - (Special attention required due to moisture sensitivity)



# Types of IC Packages used in NASA NEPP CubeSat database




- SOP package types completely dominate
- Being able to handle and process these types of packages will substantially improved quality

# Designing in Quality

- While inspection and verification remain at the heart of identifying and reducing defects, the initial design effort is the key to identifying sensitivity and building in margin to defects
- Mission Assurance evolving to more part of early phase design decisions
  - Example – simulation of PCB mechanical vibration frequency modes
    - Use of thinner/smaller scale COTS can provide significant increase in margin to mechanical vibration




# Deep Space CubeSats



- The first generation of deep space CubeSats is being developed and readied for flight now
- Reliability and Quality issues are being addressed via formal requirements tailoring process based on DTAB method
- Environmental requirements and robust system are critical elements


# Total Ionizing Dose at 1AU

- Evaluate 1.0 to 2.5 years at 1AU
- Dose as function of Aluminum thickness
- Amount of aluminum shielding will determine EEE parts requirements
- Limited shielding implies use of provide rad-tolerant to rad hard parts, depending on dose level




# High Energy Solar and Galactic Environment

- Use CREME96 models for Solar Energetic Particle (SEP) Event and GCR Heavy Ion Fluxes. Behind 25 Mils Aluminum Shielding
- Smallsat missions need at least no Single Event Latchup < 37 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg.
- Very difficult/impossible to shield





# Van Allen Belt Radiation Levels

- Transiting Van Allen Belts will also contribute to radiation exposure



# Comparison to MSL Martian Transit data measured by RAD instrument


- Averaged  $330 \mu\text{Gy/day}$  ( $0.033 \text{ Rad/day}$ ) with 5 well defined Solar Energetic Particle (SEP) events occurring during transit
- RAD shielding = most of solid angle shielded at areal density  $<10 \text{ g/cm}^2$  and the remainder broadly distributed over a range of depths up to  $80 \text{ g/cm}^2$
- 253 day (0.7 year) mission = 8.4 rad
- Equivalent dose to human = 0.465 Sievert (46.5 rem)





# Summary

- Small/CubeSats face many of the same defect based quality issues that larger heritage missions face
  - *This results in significant decrease in satellite reliability as mission time increases*
- **Multi-SmallSat constellations are quickly becoming a key mission feature to realize both reliability as well as performance goals**
- Small/CubeSats can still benefit from a formal FPP based design methodology
  - *Tailoring FPP to Small/CubeSat is key contribution/collaboration of S&MA*
- **Emphasis on defect identification and elimination throughout entire assembly and manufacturing processes (internal and external) is where S&MA discipline can be best leveraged to maximize risk mitigation effect for Small/CubeSats**
- Deep Space Small/CubeSats will have to address significant environmental conditions to ensure success



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